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Customer Ratings: 4.0 (from 9 reviews) |
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Product Description
Theories of international relations, assumed to be universally applicable, have failed to explain the creation of states in Africa. There, the interaction of power and space is dramatically different from what occurred in Europe. In his groundbreaking book, Jeffrey Herbst places the African state-building process in a truly comparative perspective, examining the problem of state consolidation from the precolonial period, through the short but intense interlude of European colonialism, to the modern era of independent states. Herbst's bold contention--that the conditions now facing African state-builders existed long before European penetration of the continent--is sure to provoke controversy, for it runs counter to the prevailing assumption that colonialism changed everything. In identifying how the African state-building process differs from the European experience, Herbst addresses the fundamental problem confronting African leaders: how to extend authority over sparsely settled lands. Indeed, efforts to exert control over vast, inhospitable territories of low population density and varied environmental and geographical zones have resulted in devastating wars, millions of refugees, and dysfunctional governments perpetrating destructive policies. Detailing the precise political calculations of distinct African leaders, Herbst isolates the basic dynamics of African state development. In analyzing how these leaders have attempted to consolidate power, he is able to evaluate a variety of policy alternatives for dealing with the fundamental political challenges facing African states today. |
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| Product Details |
| Author: |
Jeffrey Herbst |
| Binding: |
Paperback |
| Dewey Decimal Number: |
303.3096 |
| EAN: |
9780691010281 |
| Edition: |
1 |
| ISBN: |
0691010285 |
| Label: |
Princeton University Press |
| Languages: |
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| List Price: |
| Amount: |
3095 |
| Currency Code: |
USD |
| Formatted Price: |
$30.95 |
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| Manufacturer: |
Princeton University Press |
| Number Of Items: |
1 |
| Number Of Pages: |
248 |
| Package Dimensions: |
| Height: |
70 |
| Length: |
900 |
| Weight: |
85 |
| Width: |
600 |
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| Product Group: |
Book |
| Publication Date: |
2000-03-06 |
| Publisher: |
Princeton University Press |
| Studio: |
Princeton University Press |
| Title: |
States and Power in Africa |
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| Customer Reviews |
Customer Rating: 5
Review Date: 2009-02-24
0 out of 0 found this review helpful.
Summary: A Welcome Respite from Conventional IR Theory
The book is well-researched and compelling, presenting a myriad of interlinking causal factors that makes the European-style nation-state unworkable in Africa. For example: the placement of colonial centers (today's capitol cities) to favor expediency in commerce over effectiveness in ruling; the existence of a multitude of distinct national (tribal) identities, many with pre-existing governance systems; people's propensity to ally with these national identities rather than with the nation-state; the population's mobility and the willingness of individuals to shift their allegiance to neighboring groups (resulting in the practical irrelevance of state borders); the lack of a shared history between the populace and the elites that could result in a contract of mutual obligation (in Europe this was worked out over the centuries because of security concerns); the colonial preference for one-crop economies, the complexity of language politics in Africa, and much more. All this leads to conclusion that the cost-benefit ratio of extending rule effectively outward from the capitol is just not worth it. Of course, that's an oversimplification, there's a lot more here. In all the pool of evidence is deep and wide. One criticism is that some think the model is not applicable elsewhere - well, it is (I'm currently working in the Philippines). But really, I don't care if it isn't. Political science has for too long been hamstrung by the search for universal, one-size-fits-all models. The world doesn't work that way, and this book is a step toward helping the discipline grow up. |
Customer Rating: 3
Review Date: 2006-05-18
0 out of 1 found this review helpful.
Summary: Proto-States and Unconsolidated-Power in Africa
In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst frequently uses the term "international system." An instinctive reading of the term may lead to the idea of "international community" (another term that is frequently seen in the text), and there are moments in Herbst's narrative that seem to support this interpretation. Yet Herbst repeatedly stresses the importance of state development in Africa to the international system : does he mean to say that the rise and fall of Zaire or Mali are seismic events in the world community?
In fact, I would posit, "international system " refers to more than just one type of international system in Herbst book. Sometimes, the term refers to the Westphalia state model. Other times, it refers to a model that is specific to Africa only. Yet there are still moments when the term is used to mean a "meta-international system" that incorporates both the European and the African models.
First, Herbst recognizes that the Western states and the African states are fundamentally different. The Western states are built on the establishment and mutual recognition of sovereignty. But in Africa, many states have only limited sovereignty at best. For example, many African governments are effective only in urban areas; they have a hard time collecting taxes; some cannot even enforce a single currency within their borders (p226). But most telling of all: African states do not always have a monopoly on the use of force (p255).
Second, Herbst describes how the subsequently formed Western international system is equally different from the African international system. Whereas the Western system is bound together by the threat of anarchy and violence, the African system is more loosely organized but has a tradition of cooperation (p26). Although Herbst repeatedly assures us that, "fundamentally, there is nothing exotic about African politics," (p31) there is nevertheless an overwhelming sense of "otherness" in how Herbst portrays the relationship between the Western and the African international systems. For example, Herbst states at one point, "It will ... be up to the Africans to come up with alternatives to the nation-state. However, the international community can play an important role ..." (p269) If the Africans are truly part of the international community, then why the "However," but not "The rest of"?
Third, in order to have the two international systems (Western and the African) working together, Herbst urges the world to embrace a new system in which sovereignty is no longer a prerequisite (p269). To paraphrase Herbst: if the power or control is exercised within a sub-national unit (a tribe or a region, for example) why can't the international agencies engage the sub-national unit directly? Assuming Herbst's definition of engagement includes the representation of those units (or we are back to the Colonial days), he is in effect proposing a different international system--a meta-system as I termed earlier--that is a mishmash of sovereign states and non-sovereign polities. This meta-system is what he has in mind when he theorizes the relationship between state development and international system (p27).
The metamorphosis of the term "international system" reveals a fault line in Herbst's work: in essence, he is trying to replace an existing concept (Westphalia international system) with a new one (meta-international system) by using terminologies that are alive only within the existing concept. Sovereignty, system, state and nation are terms conceived in the West, and are laden with Western historical experiences . Using terms such as "sovereignty" to construct an international system without sovereignty is bound to cause enormous confusion.
However, the misappropriation of terminologies is only a minor transgression compared to the implication of Herbst's conclusion. What he advocates, in essence, is to relieve the suffering in Africa at the expense of state building . Yet he has failed to make the case that, without the kind of power that Western states have to mobilize resources within a secured border, the proto-states in Africa can survive in today's global economy--one that was created by and for strong states only. Consequently, even if the international community can find ways to accommodate a continent full of chiefdoms, people in Africa may find themselves forever condemned to impoverishment and dependency. |
Customer Rating: 5
Review Date: 2005-12-03
4 out of 4 found this review helpful.
Summary: States Make Wars, Wars Make States
The scholarly literature on state creation and consolidation usually fails to account for the African experience. The central idea of this literature is that the high population density of Europe made land relatively scarce and valuable to control, particularly from the late Middle Ages onward. This and technological change in the methods of warfare (e.g., more sophisticated battle tactics and firearms) drew states into continual conflict. But warfare is costly, and early modern states required resources to attack and defend. To get money for wars, kings had to build bureaucracies, gather information, and map their territory and people. They also had to make concessions- such as creating regular parliaments where citizens could have a voice. All these things were necessary to survive. If a state did not become "stronger", then typically it became extinct. This process created the modern system of nation states with their familiar institutional infrastructures that consolidated in Europe in the nineteenth century.
Herbst's argument is that this process has not taken place in Africa. It did not take place historically in the precolonial era, it did not take place during the colonial epoch, and it is not taking place since or now. Why?
Africa is different because the structural conditions that led to the path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent in Africa. Unlike in Europe, land was and is not scarce in Africa. Rather, labor was scarce. Thus in the precolonial period, states did not fight over land, but rather people. This meant that precolonial states had vague borders and were often very "weak". Without the constant necessity of defending a well-defined territory, states did not need to invest in bureaucracies, censuses of their populations, tax collectors, or permanent militaries.
This absence of external threats coupled with low population densities persisted. During the colonial period there was little fighting over borders between the colonial powers. The conference of Berlin in 1885 largely determined which European power would have which bit of Africa. This meant that, like the precolonial polities, European colonial powers had little incentive to develop state institutions. Instead they focused on commercial exploitation and outright plunder of the mineral and natural wealth.
Following independence, the situation could have changed but did not, because the international state system and the United Nations decided to enforce the colonial boundaries that had largely determined the form that the new nations took. This trend was reinforced by Cold War politics. Thus African states were still able to survive without having to engage in the type of institution building that occurred historically in Europe.
Herbst argues that the lack of development of African state institutions helps explain many aspects of modern Africa. Since states never had to fight to survive they never had to build effective fiscal institutions. Therefore they have no tax bases and instead have to engage in highly distortionary methods of raising taxes (such as taxing trade) or redistributing income (for example via employment in parastatals). Foreign aid or rents from oil and minerals also allowed them to stay in power without having to develop indigenous channels of accountability. States never had to make political concessions to their citizens, hence the lack of functioning domestic political institutions such as parliaments and the completely unconsolidated nature of democracy in Africa. Moreover, the lack of these institutions can help explain the extent of venality and state corruption in Africa since these institutions provide key checks on such abuses.
This book discusses not only the history and politics of state creation and consolidation, but also evaluates policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges Africans states face today. Its contention that the international community should stand ready to accept partition or the redrawing of borders is likely to keep fueling debates in the years to come. But although the potential costs of anarchy and chaos that a territorial restructuring of Africa could bring about are legitimate concerns, they need to be weighted against the current ongoing decay that prevails in several parts of Africa and that has already ignited a process of territorial reshuffling. We may have to accept the fact that in twenty years, the map of Africa is unlikely to look like that of today and of forty years ago.
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Customer Rating: 5
Review Date: 2005-09-13
3 out of 3 found this review helpful.
Summary: Realism for Africa
Smart and insightful - a realistic look at the causes of many of Africa's problems today, without the usual shallow laying of blame on colonialism or traditional African society. Beyond that, it makes one take a critical look at state formation and the limitations and assumptions that go with it, coming as a welcome respite from the European models of state formation that are too often foisted on the rest of the world. Others outline the content well, so I won't bother. Just to say I highly recommend it. A book of practical realities. |
Customer Rating: 1
Review Date: 2004-02-22
7 out of 12 found this review helpful.
Summary: Overbearing
As a citizen from one of the countries in Africa, I found this book most overbearing. I confess I started to get prejudiced from the inception, when Herbst describes his arrival in the clouds, on the continent, and how he cast an eagle eye on us from the plane and began brooding about our fate. How godly!!! But I have learned to appreciate Western books on us as a portrayal of Western gaze, rather than a portrayal of our realities. As such, the book is interesting, although it reaches certain conclusions (decertifying states, dumping the Addis rules, all this under outside compulsion) that, given the current propensities of the American government, should be considered by any African patriot as extremely dangerous. |
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